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Abstract—The ease of use of the Internet has enabled violent
extremists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
to easily reach large audience, build personal relationships and
increase recruitment. Social media are primarily based on the
reports they receive from their own users to mitigate the problem.
Despite efforts of social media in suspending many accounts,
this solution is not guaranteed to be effective, because not all
extremists are caught this way, or they can simply return with
another account or migrate to other social networks. In this
paper, we design an automatic detection scheme that using as
little as three groups of information related to usernames, profile,
and textual content of users, determines whether or not a given
username belongs to an extremist user. We first demonstrate that
extremists are inclined to adopt usernames that are similar to
the ones that their like-minded have adopted in the past. We
then propose a detection framework that deploys features which
are highly indicative of potential online extremism. Results on
a real-world ISIS-related dataset from Twitter demonstrate the
effectiveness of the methodology in identifying extremist users.
Index Terms—Extremists, Social media, Feature Engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Last years have witnessed a huge rise in the threat of
radicalized extremists groups who seek to commit insurgent
attacks around the globe. While new technologies such as
the Internet and social media are now being used by many
users [3], [20], they have also been leveraged extensively by
radicalized groups to make relationships with their audience
and recruit new members [15]. Social media platforms such
as Twitter are now being utilized by terrorist organizations,
to directly communicate with their worldwide audience [11].
The free and unregulated nature of these tools, have helped
extremists to easily form online communities and disseminate
their beliefs and training materials, without a fear of getting
censored on traditional media outlets.
Recently, social networks have begun to actively fight
against these groups. In august 2016, Twitter which has
been long believed to be the main propaganda for ISIS,
finally took serious actions by shutting down over 36,000
ISIS related accounts [1]. Social media are primarily based
on the reports they receive from their own users, or from
specific teams assigned to mitigate the problem. Recently they
began to explore more effective ways such as using algorithms
(e.g. spam-fighting algorithms) to automatically detect any
violent content as supplements to these reports and boost
performance [16]. Despite the huge effort of these social
networks in shutting down many accounts, this solution is
not guaranteed to be effective, because not all extremists are
caught this way, and the owners of suspended accounts can
simply return with another account or migrate to other social
networks. Consequently, extra efforts need to be dedicated to
proposing capabilities that could be deployed by authorities
to combat radicalized extremists and mitigate their threats,
regardless of the underlying social network platform.
Present work. In this paper, we design a detection scheme
that using as little as three groups of information (inspired
from the literature [8], [11], [19]), can determine whether
or not a given username1 belongs to an extremist user.
Specifically, we use a dataset from Twitter [25] and first
show that extremist users on Twitter tend to adopt handles
that follow similar patterns, in contrast to the normal users.
Then, a detection framework is proposed to identify if a given
Twitter handle belongs to an extremist given its proximity to an
existing set of extremist-related handles. We compare different
supervised and semi-supervised approaches using the features
from Twitter handle, profile information and content which
are highly indicative of online extremism. To further show the
significance of the features we conduct significance analysis of
the features using the labeled instances and feature selection
measure χ2 and compare our results against char-LSTM which
automatically extracts features.
Contributions. Our main contributions are thus summarized
in below:
• We first demonstrate that extremists on Twitter are in-
clined towards adopting handles with similar patterns.To
that end, we used the well-known Lavenshtein ratio as a
measure of distance between two Twitter handles and per-
formed two-sample t-test to demonstrate that compared to
normal users, extremists tend to choose similar handles.
• We propose three main groups of features, related to
the Twitter handles, profile information and tweet-level
content. Overall, our feature engineering scheme has 13
features which are then fed into different supervised and
semi-supervised learners.
• Results on a real-world ISIS-related dataset demonstrate
that the introduced features are effective in detecting
online violent extremists in social media.
Observations. We make the following observations:
• The highest precision of 0.96 in identification of the
extremists belongs to SVM. This is in line with the
previous research that SVM performs well on textual
data.
1In this work, we may use the terms usernames and handles interchangeably
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• Among several approaches used in this work, char-LSTM
and the semi-supervised approach LabelSpreading with
RBF kernel achieve the equal and highest F1-score of
0.76. The fact that the LabelSpreading achieves compara-
ble performance as char-LSTM, further demonstrates the
effectiveness of the proposed feature engineering scheme,
as LSTM has shown promising results in the literature
while it does not use any hand-crafted features.
• Char-LSTM achieves a precision of 0.77 while main-
taining a high recall of 0.76 on the positive class. This
suggests that the memory module in LSTM can help in
minimizing the number of false negatives.
II. RELATED WORK
The explosive growth of the Web has raised numerous
security and privacy issues. Mitigating these concerns has
been studied from different aspects [6], [18], [23], [26].
For instance, several studies have focused on understanding
extremism in social networks [4], [5], [8], [9], [11], [16], [17].
For instance, the work of [11], uses Twitter and proposes an
approach to predict new extremists. They also determine if
the newly created account belongs to a suspended extremist,
and predict the ego-network of the suspended extremist upon
creating her new account. Their approach integrates variants of
the logistic regression with optimized search policies to detect
the new accounts of returning suspended extremist users. They
(1) use potential features of an account to predict if this
account belongs to an extremist user, (2) determine if multiple
accounts belong to the same extremist user, based on the fact
that new account shall resemble the suspended account in
different aspects, (3) predict whom the suspended extremist
user is most likely to follow again, and finally (4) develop
a network search policy to find the suspected users upon
returning to a social network. Similar work of [8] uses tweets
to build models to predict (1) if a pro-ISIS user’s account will
be suspended due to the extremist content, (2) which users
will adopt and retweet ISIS content, and (3) which users will
have interactions with pro-ISIS users. To do so, the authors use
logistic regression and random forest classifiers for different
types of prediction tasks. They deploy variety of features
across different dimensions, such as user meta-data, network
statistics and temporal patterns of activity. Two scenarios are
then designed for each prediction task: a time independent
(static) one which does not take into account the temporal
dependencies, and a simulated real-time one by considering
the timeline of content availability. The difference between
these two studies is, authors of [11] also study other aspects
including identifying multiple accounts for an extremist user,
re-following suspended accounts’ connections and searching
for the suspended extremist users who might return to a social
media.
Other works also seek to identify the extremist content
in radicalized groups beyond ISIS. The work of [16] uses
data from Jihadist website Ansar AlJihad Network to develop
supervised learning and NLP techniques to automatically
detect cyber-recruitment of extremist groups. A comparison
is done between classifiers naı¨ve Bayes, logistic regression,
classification trees, boosting and SVM, for labeling forum
posts as either related or not related to the recruitment of
extremist groups. They leverage the bag-of-words technique
to convert the corpus into a term-document matrix, following
the standard routine of the preprocessing techniques such as
basic normalization and stemming. Similarly in [17], same
Jihadist network along with their previously developed SVM
classifier are used to automatically identify recruitment posts.
Their previous work shall be served as pre-screening step to
reduce the efforts made by human analysts to manually hand-
label the documents. In their new study, the textual content
of the dataset is analyzed with latent Dirichlet allocation
(LDA) and fed into several time-series models to predict cyber-
recruitment. This new research conducted by the same authors
complemented their previous study, by applying current natu-
ral language processing and time series analysis techniques to
forecast the recruitments.
Beyond these works, the work of [9] takes a different
approach to track individual’s behavioral indicators of home-
grown extremism, using public and law enforcement data. The
intuition is to use graph pattern matching to identify suspicious
trajectories and potential radicalization over a dynamic hetero-
geneous graph associated with the fused data from public and
law enforcement. The authors first develop a query pattern
of radicalization and then run several graph pattern matching
algorithms to detect and track the on-going radicalization.
They develop the investigative simulation graph pattern match-
ing technique, which is composed of required extension to
the existing dual simulation graph pattern matching method
to avoid over-matching. This approach provides analysts and
law enforcement officials with the ability to find partial/full
matches, given a query of radicalization, as well as the pace
of the appearance of the radicalized extremists. As opposed to
the above studies, in this paper, we make the first attempt on
determining if a given Twitter handle belongs to an extremist
user or not, using only little information gathered from the
handle, profile and content.
III. DATA PREPARATION
The dataset was collected from Twitter and consists of ap-
proximately 1.6M tweets that were posted using 25 extremism-
related hashtags such as #AbuBakralBaghdadi, #ISIL, #ISIS,
#Daesh, and #IslamicState. We construct our extremist
labels (positive labels) by collecting a limited number of 150
suspended ISIS-related Twitter handles which were reported
to the Twitter Safety account (@TwitterSafety) by normal
users. To make a balanced labeled dataset, 150 random handles
corresponding to normal users were also collected to serve as
our negative labels.
Inspired by the literature [8], [11], [19], we define 3 major
groups of overall 13 features, which could be leveraged to
filter out less likely extremists. This way, we obtain 300K
highly extremism related tweets from which we randomly pick
a smaller sample of 3K handles who posted the tweets. The
description of the dataset is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET.
Name Value
Raw 1.6M
Filtered 300K
Unlabeled (sampled) 3K
Labeled Positive Negative
150 150
IV. METHODOLOGY
Here, we first present the introduced feature groups used to
filter out less likely extremists from the data. Next, we will
pose our research questions and seek to answer them.
A. Feature Engineering
We categorize the features used in this work into the
following 3 major groups:
1) Twitter handle’s related features: this group contains 3
features related to the given handle, namely, length of the
handle, number of unique characters in the handle, and
complexity of the handle. To compute the complexity,
Kolmogorov complexity is used, which is defined as the
length of the shortest program to reproduce the handle
on a universal machine such as Turing machine [13].
Since Kolmogorov complexity is computationally in-
tractable, we use the Entropy of the handle as a way
to approximate its complexity.
2) Profile related features: this group contains 7 features
related to the profile of the user who posted the tweet, in-
cluding the number of her followers, friends and tweets,
the existence of profile’s description and location. Also,
for the last two features in this group, we check if the
account is verified and geo-enabled.
3) Content related features: we have the following 3
features related to the content of the given tweet: the
number of URLs, the number of hashtags and the
sentiment of the content. For the sentiment, we check if
the content has a higher negative score than its positive
score.
For the sake of visualization, a 2-D projection of the sample
of the filtered dataset (using t-SNE transformation [22]) is
depicted in Fig. 1. As it is seen, basic clustering techniques
such as K-means will have difficulty to correctly assign labels
to the unlabeled instances using only few existing labeled
samples.
B. Research Questions
Having defined the feature engineering scheme in the pre-
vious section, here, we seek to answer the following research
questions that will ultimately help identifying violent extrem-
ists in social media:
• RQ1: Are extremists on Twitter inclined to adopt
similar handles?
Fig. 1. 2-D projection of the sampled filtered data using t-SNE transformation.
Clustering techniques such as K-means will have difficulty to correctly assign
labels to the unlabeled instances using only few existing labeled samples.
• RQ2: Can we infer the labels (extremist vs. non-
extremist) of unseen handles based on their proximity
to the labeled instances?
To answer the first question, for each pair of extremist users
(i, j) we compute the similarity between their corresponding
handles 〈si, sj〉 as follows.
Sim(si, sj) =
1− L(si, sj)
max(len(si), len(sj))
(1)
where L(si, sj) is the well-known Lavenshtein ratio [12]
which is used as a measure of distance between the two
strings s1 and s2. We create a vector ve whose elements are
similarity scores between each pair of extremists. We repeat
the procedure for each pair of extremist i and a normal user
k and create a vector ven. We conduct a two-sample t-test on
ve and ven with the null and alternative hypotheses defined as
H0 : ve ≤ ven, H1 : ve > ven. The null hypothesis is rejected
at significance level α = 0.01 and p-value of p = 0.009,
suggesting that extremists are biased towards adopting similar
handles. Although this might seem a bit simplistic at the first
sight, it has not been examined in the literature. Later, we
will see how effective this simple idea could be in inferring
the labels for unseen handles and help detecting the extremists
by merely glancing at their handles.
To answer the second question, let us first obtain our feature
spaces associated with the labeled and unlabeled instances, by
converting each handle to a vector of 5 features. We use the
following features: length of the handle, maximum number of
occurrence of a character in the handle, number of unique
characters in the handle, number of digits that the handle
starts with, and complexity of the handle. Ultimately, these
two feature spaces are fed as the inputs to the semi-supervised
and supervised learners.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first describe the learners used in this
work and provide details on the parameters they use. Then,
classification results are presented and finally significance of
the features is discussed.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE METHODS ON THE LABELED DATA, FOR THE
POSITIVE (EXTREMIST) CLASS.
Learner Precision Recall F1-score
SVM 0.96 0.5 0.65
Char-LSTM 0.77 0.76 0.76
LabelSpreading (RBF) 0.85 0.69 0.76
Laplacian SVM 0.89 0.6 0.7
LabelSpreading (KNN) 0.83 0.67 0.73
Co-Training (SVM) 0.9 0.53 0.66
KNN 0.81 0.7 0.74
Gaussian NB 0.89 0.56 0.69
Logistic Regression 0.76 0.61 0.67
AdaBoost 0.88 0.58 0.69
Random Forest 0.79 0.71 0.74
Fig. 2. Frequency of each handle-related feature in the filtered dataset for
(left) labeled and (right) unlabeled instances. The most frequent features for
labeled and unlabeled instances are Max # of occurrence of a character in a
handle and Complexity of a handle.
A. Approaches
• Semi-Supervised: Laplacian support vector machines
(SVM) [2], graph inference-based label spreading ap-
proach [21] with radial basis function (RBF) and
K-nearest neighbor (KNN) kernels, and co-training
learner [7] with two SVMs.
• Supervised: SVM, KNN, Gaussian naı¨ve Bayes, lo-
gistic regression, adaboost, random forest, and Char-
LSTM [24].
We note that supervised learners only use labeled instances
for the training process, while semi-supervised algorithms use
labeled and unlabeled instances [10].
For the sake of fair comparison, all algorithms were imple-
mented and run in Python. Note for the methods that require
special tuning of parameters, we performed grid search to
choose the best set of parameters. Before going any further,
we define the parameters used in each learner and then
demonstrate their best picked values by our grid search.
• SVM: Tolerance for stopping criteria was set to the
default value of 0.001. Penalty parameter C was set to 1
and linear kernel was used.
• Char-LSTM: This is similar to the character-aware
models used for sequential word predictions. We adapt
the neural network to a sequence classification problem
where the inputs are the vector of one-hot encoding of
each character of the handle and the output is the handle
being classified as extremist or non-extremist. We set the
maximum username length to 10, padding with zeros
where necessary. We use an embedding layer after the
input layer to convert each username dimension to 16.
This is fed to a single layer LSTM module having 30
units.
• LabelSpreading (RBF): RBF Kernel was used and γ
was set to the default value of 20.
• Laplacian SVM: We used linear kernel and set the
parameters Cl = 0.6 and Cs = 0.6.
• LabelSpreading (KNN): KNN kernel was used and the
number of neighbors was set to 5.
• Co-training (SVM): We followed the algorithm intro-
duced in [7] and used two SVM as our classifiers. For
both SVMs we set the tolerance for stopping criteria to
0.001 and the penalty parameter C = 1.
• KNN: The number of neighbors was set to 5.
• Gaussian NB: There were no specific parameter to tune.
• Logistic regression: We used the l2 penalty. We also
set the parameter C = 1 (the inverse of regularization
strength) and tolerance for stopping criteria to 0.01.
• Adaboost: The number of estimators was set to 200 and
we also set the learning rate to 0.01.
• Random forest: We used 200 estimators and the entropy
criterion was used.
B. Classification Results
We use tenfold cross-validation on the labeled data as
follows. We first divided the set of labeled instances into 10
different sets of equal size. Each time, we held one set out for
validation (we did this by removing their labels and adding
them to the unlabeled instances). For the supervised learners,
this set along with a set of the existing unlabeled samples are
only used for the purpose of testing whereas for the semi-
supervised setting, we use both sets in the training and testing
phases. This procedure is performed for all approaches for
the sake of fair comparison. Finally, we report the average of
10 different runs, using various evaluation metrics including
precision, recall and F1-score in Table II.
Observations. We make the following observations:
• SVM achieve the highest precision of 0.96 in identifying
online violent extremists, which shows the significance
of the proposed feature set.
• The semi-supervised LabelSpreading (RBF) was able to
perform as good as Char-LSTM and they both achieve
the highest F1-score on identification of extremists. This
along with the fact that Char-LSTM has shown promising
results in the literature while it does not use any of our
hand-crafted features, further demonstrates the effective-
ness of the introduced feature engineering scheme.
• For char-LSTM, we achieve a precision of 0.77 while
maintaining a high recall of 0.76 on the positive class.
This suggests that the memory module in LSTM can help
in minimizing the number of false negatives.
Overall, the observations we make here suggest that the
answer to the second question is positive– using an existing
set of labeled examples could help inferring the labels of
unseen usernames.
TABLE III
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEATURES USING THE LABELED INSTANCES AND
χ2 . THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE FOR THE LABELED SET IS # of
unique characters in a handle.
Feature χ2
Length of the handle 22.73
Max # of occurrence of a character 0.24
# of unique characters 37.2
# of digits the handle starts with 12.57
Complexity of the handle 3.18
C. Significance of Features
We conduct significance analysis of the features using the
labeled instances and feature selection measure χ2. The results
in Table III suggest that the most significant feature is the
number of the unique characters in the username while the
least important one is the maximum number of occurrence
of a character in the username. This observation further
demonstrates that frequency and importance of the features in
the labeled dataset are not necessarily in line with each other
and in fact are inversely related in our case. In other words,
although maximum number of occurrence of a character in the
username is the most frequent feature in the labeled dataset,
it is the least important feature in identification of online
violent extremists according to the Fig. 2 where we depict
the frequency of each feature for both labeled and unlabeled
examples.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we presented a scheme that using as little
as three groups of information related to the Twitter handle,
profile and textual content of users, can determine if a given
handle could belong to an extremist. The framework first uses
highly indicative patterns related to extremism to filter out
less likely extremists. Ultimately, high likely extremist are
identified using only features related to their usernames.
In future, we would like to replicate the work by deploying
more features and investigate if incorporating those features
to the framework can lead to performance boost. We also plan
to incorporate the feature space designed in this work into
a semi-supervised learner as regularization terms in order to
further increase the classification performance in detecting on-
line violent extremists. Finally, since hand-labeling unlabeled
examples is expensive, a valuable research direction would be
to deploy active learning to enable iterative supervised learning
to actively query for labels.
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